of evaluating the data independently and illuminating
it from different perspectives, helps
a lot when it comes to the interpretation of
the data. The fact that we never had an R value
significantly above 1 over a long period of
time could be observed both from the modeling
and empirically. This had to be clearly taken
into account when interpreting exponential
growth, because a virus does not spread exponentially
over the long term. You can only see
that if you repeatedly use empirical data as a
“benchmark” next to the model. That helped
us to assess the situation better and better.
You closed your Twitter account. Will
you continue to follow the modeling?
Yes. I was bothered by how the discussion
went and how brutalization became
more and more evident. It is of course clear
that every modeler has his own hypothesis,
because science is impossible without a
working hypothesis. My aim was to publish
the data as soberly and factually as possible
and not spread panic or unfounded euphoria.
Errors do occur, but the comparison with
reality ultimately helps to further improve the
model. In October, I actually had an underestimation
of around 40% because I always
assume a total number of positively tested at
a certain point in time and forecast that.
For example, the model does not expect
more than 3.8 million people who tested
positive by the end of June 2021; we are
currently at around 3.69. If I now want
to calculate the incidence, I have to break
down the model further. Opponents' arguments
were often taken out of context in
the comments on Twitter.
For example, based on my calculations,
I have always advocated a hard and therefore
short lockdown. This is economical and
makes the most sense for people's souls. But
you have to systematically pursue this right
from the start and not torment people with a
“light” lockdown for months.
You can only use two strategies: either
an elimination strategy (“zero covid”) or a
reduction strategy. Unlike New Zealand, for
example, Germany did not opt for a zero
strategy because the severity of the associated
measures was inappropriate there and
could not be implemented here. We survived
the pandemic in Germany reasonably
well, but paid a significantly higher price
(not only economically) for it.
Communication in particular could have
been better. For example, one could have
developed prognosis models at the RKI and
then brought together the well-known virologists
in order to achieve a uniform language,
instead of just updating the data development
and letting everyone present different
interpretations that unsettle the public. However,
it must also be stated that the RKI has
developed further in this pandemic and has
made good progress in presenting the data.
How do you see the influence of new
mutants?
I would leave that part of your question and
the health dimension to the medical community,
who has been little heard of, but I
wouldn't speak of a new wave with every
mutation. I see the event as a wave with
peaks and downs rather than a sequence of
several waves, because a virus would have to
be completely eradicated for that.
Indeed, some of the mutations elude
vaccination and it can therefore be assumed
that the currently falling incidences will not
remain permanently low. Vaccination successes
are currently seen more in the declining
fatalities than in the case numbers. More
mutants will appear, where you have to react
more decisively. At the beginning, international
air traffic was underestimated. This is
now under control through PCR tests and
quarantine rules and can help to reduce the
entry of mutants. But of course the mutants
remain a great risk to watch.
How do you assess the development in
the very near future?
You can currently assume that the number of
cases at least for a certain time will halve every
2-3 weeks. I suspect we can get below an incidence
of 10 as early as the beginning of July. I
assume that we will remain low until the fourth
quarter and that we will not experience any dramatic
increases afterwards if the vaccination
progress continues at this rate.
The question of the rapid test strategy
remains important to discuss. Especially in schools
with very low positive rates of well below 0.1% for
the rapid tests, it should be linked to the positivity
rate of the PCR tests. At the end of December we
had a peak with a 15% positivity rate, currently
we are a little below 6%. My cautious prognosis
is that if the positivity rate is below 5%, the rapid
tests could be withdrawn in some areas, primarily
schools. One should also look at the incidence
value here. A 7-day value of 35 infected people
per 100,000, on which there is at least political
consensus, should be a trigger for further easing.
Constantly new incidence values with the promise
of easing, which are then not implemented, wears
down the population and endangers the previous
disciplined compliance with the rules.
Corona News 19
When do you see the economy recovering?
The recovery period will take longer than
originally anticipated. Many sit in the home
office, which tends to reduce productivity
and distort many processes that can only be
gradually stabilized again. Many have become
too anxious and do not yet dare to return
to normal working life. Certain indicators
such as the inflation rate or wood prices and
building material prices are rising. It must be
mentioned that Germany budgets the most
per capita on Corona aid packages and that
many mistakes have been made in the award
design. It will be a great challenge to get
everything back to normal.
Thank you very much.
* Dr. Hasan Alkas is professor of microeconomics
with a focus on international
markets and until 2015 was the founding
dean of the “Society and Economics”
faculty at the Rhein-Waal University of
Applied Sciences in Kleve. Among other
things, he teaches the subjects of micro-,
regulatory and organizational economics,
game theory, innovation management
and institutional economics. In particular,
he conducts research in the areas of regulatory
economics, investment behavior
in ICT markets, technology and industrial
policy and price bundling.
Prof. Dr. Alkas studied economics in
Bonn and Sussex and completed his doctorate
in Cologne. He then worked as a
senior economist at the Scientific Institute
for Infrastructure and Communication
Services (WIK) until 2001 as a project
manager in the field of regulatory economics
and investment theory and pricing
strategies in network industries, which
resulted in several publications. This was
followed by a position at Deutsche Telekom
in a managerial position in the
field of regulation and politics. At the
same time, Prof. Alkas worked for several
years as a senior advisor to the Minister
for Transport and Communication in Turkey.
As a principal economist, he worked
from 2006 until he was appointed professor
at the European Commission in
Brussels. The main focus of work was the
competitiveness and innovation aspects
of ICT, productivity analyzes, key enabling
technologies (KETs) as well as energy
and industrial policy.
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